

EXHIBIT III

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION**

IN RE: OPANA ER ANTITRUST LITIGATION

This Document Relates to:

DIRECT PURCHASER ACTIONS

**MDL 2580
Case No. 14-cv-10150**

**DECLARATION OF JEFFREY J. LEITZINGER, PH.D.
Related to Proposed Allocation Plan and
Net Settlement Fund Allocation**

Econ ONE Research, Inc.

July 19, 2022

550 South Hope St., Suite 800
Los Angeles, CA 90071

I. Introduction

1. I am the same Jeffrey J. Leitzinger who previously submitted three expert reports in this case.¹ A summary of my experience and qualifications was contained in my previous declarations and reports. An updated summary of my training, past experience, and prior testimony is shown in Exhibit 1. I have been asked by counsel for the Direct Purchaser Class² Plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”) in this matter to develop a procedure that can be used to allocate the Net Settlement Fund³ among Class members (or their assignees) who submit valid, accepted claims as part of the claims process (“Claimants”). The purpose of this declaration is to describe the procedure I have developed.
2. Econ One is being compensated for the time I spend on this matter at my normal and customary rate of \$895 per hour. Econ One also is being compensated for time spent by my research staff on this matter at their normal and customary hourly rates.

II. Allocation Plan

3. The procedure I have developed for purposes of allocating the Net Settlement Fund would set individual Claimant allocations in proportion to a combined total of each

¹ See Expert Report of Jeffrey J. Leitzinger, Ph.D., dated March 25, 2019 (“Report” or “Leitzinger Report”); Rebuttal Report of Jeffrey J. Leitzinger, Ph.D., dated November 5, 2019 (“Rebuttal Report” or “Leitzinger Rebuttal Report”) (collectively, “Reports”); Supplemental Report of Jeffrey J. Leitzinger, Ph.D., dated July 26, 2021 (“Supplemental Report” or “Leitzinger Supplemental Report”).

² The certified Class is defined as: “All persons or entities in the U.S. and its territories, including Puerto Rico, who purchased brand or generic Opana ER 5, 10, 20, 30, and/or 40 mg tablets directly from Defendants at any time during the period from April 1, 2011 until August 31, 2017 (the ‘Class’). Excluded from the Class are the Defendants and their officers, directors, management, employees, subsidiaries, or affiliates, and all federal governmental entities.” Order Granting Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiffs’ Motion to Approve the Form and Manner of Notice to the Direct Purchaser Class, 9/23/21, p. 1.

I also understand that the following entities who have independently filed actions and previously opted out of the Class are excluded from the Class: CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Rite Aid Corporation, Rite Aid Hdqtrs. Corp., Walgreen Co., The Kroger Co., Albertsons LLC, Safeway Inc. and H-E-B L.P (the “Retailer Plaintiffs”). ECF No. 768.

³ The Net Settlement Fund refers to the amount payable to the Class pursuant to the settlement with Impax Laboratories, Inc. (“Impax”), plus interest, net of Court-approved attorneys’ fees, named plaintiff service awards, and Court-approved expenses and administrative costs.

Claimant's net direct purchases⁴ during the period of April 1, 2011 through December 31, 2017. This includes, specifically:

- a. Opana ER from April 1, 2011 through August 31, 2017. April 1, 2011 is the beginning of the Class Period and the beginning of the overcharge period I analyzed in my prior reports.⁵ August 31, 2017 is the last date that Opana ER was sold by Endo.
 - b. Generic Opana ER sold by Impax for the period from January 7, 2013 through December 31, 2017. January 7, 2013 is the first date on which generic Opana ER was sold according to the sales data produced by Impax in this litigation, and December 31, 2017 is the end of the period for which I measured overcharges in my previous reports. Claimants' purchases of generic Opana ER will be weighted relative to the Claimants' purchases of Opana ER by the respective average relative overcharges associated with brand and generic purchases, as set forth in my Supplemental Report and described below.⁶
4. This *pro rata* allocation procedure is similar to court-approved allocation procedures in other cases involving alleged overcharges from delayed generic competition in which I have participated as an expert, including *In re Intuniv Antitrust Litigation*, No.

⁴ Here and throughout this declaration, unless otherwise noted, when I refer to "purchases" I am referring to 5 mg, 10 mg, 20 mg, 30 mg, and 40 mg Opana ER and/or generic Opana ER purchases made directly from Endo Health Solutions Inc., Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc., or Penwest Pharmaceuticals Co., (collectively, "Endo") and/or Impax (collectively "Defendants"). Claimants' *pro rata* share will be based only on Opana ER and generic Opana ER purchases made directly from Defendants and will not be based on any Opana ER or generic Opana ER purchases the Claimants may have purchased directly or indirectly from any other entity (with the exception of Claimants who are filing a Claim Form on the basis of an assignment; these Claimants' shares are discussed in footnote 10 below) and will not be based on any other strengths of Opana ER or generic Opana ER. In addition, "purchases" throughout refers to purchases net of returns and the unit of "purchases" is a milligram (mg).

⁵ See Supplemental Report at Exhibit 2. I understand that Plaintiffs allege that generic Opana ER would have launched as early as April 1, 2011 absent the challenged conduct.

⁶ The difference in relative overcharges results from the fact that overcharges on brand purchases reflect the difference between actual brand prices (paid by Class members) and the lower prices for generics that would have been purchased instead, whereas overcharges on generic purchases reflect the difference between the actual prices paid for generic purchases (prices that are below brand prices) and the even lower generic prices that would have been paid with additional generic competition.

16-cv-12653 (D. Mass.); *In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litigation*, MDL No. 2472 (D.R.I.); *In re Solodyn (Minocycline Hydrochloride) Antitrust Litigation*, No. 14-md-2503-DJC (D. Mass.); *In re Celebrex (Celecoxib) Antitrust Litigation*, No. 2:14-cv-00361 (E.D. Va.); *In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litigation*, No. 14-md-2521 (N.D. Cal.); *In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation*, No. 01-cv-1652 (SRC)(CLW) (D.N.J.); *King Drug Company of Florence, Inc., et al. v. Cephalon, Inc. et al.*, No. 06-CV-1797-MSG (E.D. Pa.); *In re Doryx Antitrust Litig. (Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., v. Warner Chilcott Public Ltd.)*, No. 12-cv-3824 (E.D. Pa.); *In re Miralax Antitrust Litig.*, No. 07-cv-142 (D. Del.); *In re Prograf Antitrust Litig.*, No. 11-md-2242 (D. Mass.); *In re Metoprolol Succinate Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig.*, No. 06-cv-52 (D. Del.); *In re Tricor Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig.*, No. 05-cv-340 (D. Del.); *In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig.*, No. 08-cv-2431 (E.D. Pa.); and *In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig.*, No. 14-md-2516 (D. Conn.).

5. In particular, I would calculate the allocation percentages for each Claimant in the following manner:
- a. Calculate branded Opana ER purchases from April 1, 2011 through August 31, 2017 using Endo's sales data;
 - b. Calculate generic Opana ER purchases from Impax from January 7, 2013 through December 31, 2017 using the sales data produced by Impax;
 - c. From the totals in (a) and (b), remove any purchases for which the rights to damages in this litigation have been assigned by agreement, using data provided by the Claimant or its corresponding assignee;
 - d. Multiply the generic Opana ER totals calculated for each Claimant in (b), net of any assignments identified in (c), by 0.4.⁷ For instance, if a Claimant had 100 generic purchase units and did not assign the rights to overcharges for any of these purchases, these generic purchase units

⁷ The application of this 0.4 factor to generic purchases accounts for the fact that the average per-unit overcharge identified in my Supplemental Report for generic Opana ER purchases is 40 percent of the average brand Opana ER per-unit overcharge during the period during which I measured overcharges in my prior Reports, April 1, 2011 through December 31, 2017 (the overcharge period).

- would translate to 40 purchase units on this overcharge-weighted brand-equivalent basis;
- e. Add the adjusted generic purchase volume calculated in (d) to the brand purchase volumes of Opana ER calculated in (a), net of any assignments identified in (c) in order to obtain an “overcharge-weighted” total purchase volume for each Claimant; and
 - f. Allocate the Net Settlement Fund to each Claimant based upon its percentage share of the total overcharge-weighted purchase volumes across all Claimants who submit valid, accepted Claim Forms.⁸
6. Based on data produced in discovery, I have prepared preliminary tabulations of each Class member’s (a) Opana ER purchases from Endo from April 1, 2011 through August 31, 2017; and (b) generic Opana ER purchases from Impax from January 7, 2013 through December 31, 2017. These calculations already account for the Class members’ assignments to the retailer entities that previously opted out of the Class.⁹ These tabulations can be used to pre-populate Claim Forms mailed to Class members. In addition, these calculations, in final form, would then serve as the basis for the calculations of allocation percentages described above. These tabulations account for all known assignments.¹⁰


⁸ Allocations to Claimants whose right to settlement allocation arises by virtue of an assignment would be determined in this same fashion. In these cases, the volumes of brand and generic purchases used to determine the allocation would be the volumes assigned to the Claimant by an otherwise eligible Class member (and the assignor Class member’s brand and generic purchase volumes would be reduced by the same amount).

⁹ These preliminary calculations use sales data showing the purchases by the Retailer Plaintiffs that have opted out of the Class that was produced in work papers provided by Dr. Keith Leffler, the economist working with these entities.

¹⁰ Counsel for the direct purchaser Class has provided what I understand to be all known assignments by a Class member of rights with respect to its damage recoveries to another party. Based upon these assignments, and using data provided by the Claimant or its corresponding assignee, I have subtracted the assigned volumes from the brand purchases (or if applicable generic purchases) for the assigning Class member. These assigned volumes would then be used in the calculation of allocation percentages for the assignees. If new assignees come forward during the allocation process my calculations can easily be updated to account for these entities.

7/19/2022

7. I understand that Class Counsel are proposing an option for Claimants to submit their own purchase data should they wish. To the extent submissions from individual Claimants differ from transaction data provided by Defendants, I will review the available data and documentation and confer with the claims administrator and Class Counsel in order to finalize the calculations. In addition, in finalizing my calculations, I will also account for any additional assignments identified during the claims administration process and/or the extent to which not all Class members file claims (which would cause the *pro rata* shares of Claimants who do file valid, accepted claims to increase). My final calculations will assign *pro rata* shares only to those Claimants who submit a valid, accepted Claim Form (and will not assign *pro rata* shares of the Net Settlement Fund to, for example, a Class member that does not submit a Claim Form).
8. In my opinion, this allocation method is practical and efficient inasmuch as it uses Defendants' sales data--already produced during this litigation--for brand and generic Opana ER--the same data I used in calculating aggregate Class overcharges. In addition, as noted above, this allocation method employs allocation approaches similar to those approved by courts in other similar cases. Finally, this method provides a fair and reasonable procedure, in my opinion, for distributing the Net Settlement Fund and reimbursing Claimants. It reflects the type and approximate extent of their injury as alleged (according to my prior overcharge calculations) and does not systematically favor recovery (relative to actual overcharges) on the part of potential Claimants who purchased brand Opana ER or generic Opana ER.
9. The foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.



Jeffrey J. Leitzinger, Ph.D.
July 19, 2022



Dr. JEFFREY J. LEITZINGER
Managing Director
Los Angeles, California
Tel: 213 624 9600

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, University of California, Los Angeles
M.A., Economics, University of California, Los Angeles
B.S., Economics, Santa Clara University

WORK EXPERIENCE

Econ One Research, Inc., 1997 to date
Board Chairman and Managing Director, 2018 to date
Management Committee Chair, 2012-2018
President and CEO, 1997-2011
Founder, 1997

Micronomics, Inc., 1988-1997
President and CEO, 1994-1997
Executive Vice President, 1988-1994
Cofounder, 1988

National Economic Research Associates, Inc. 1980-1988
(Last position was Senior Vice President and member of the Board of Directors)

California State University, Northridge, Lecturer, 1979-1980

BOARD EXPERIENCE

Board of Visitors, UCLA Department of Economics, 2018-present
California United Bank, 2015-2017
Advisory Board Member, American Antitrust Institute, 2013-present
Bolton & Company, 2006-present
First Enterprise Bank, 2006-2015
Blind Children's Center, 2005-present

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AREAS OF EXPERTISE

Has offered expert testimony regarding:

- Competition economics
- Commercial damages
- Econometrics and statistics
- Intellectual property
- Valuation

INVITED PRESENTATIONS

Some Implications of Tyson for Econometric Models in Class Action Antitrust Cases, *American Bar Association*, 65th Antitrust Law Spring Meeting, March 2017.

Where Are We on Class Certification? Examples from Health Care and Pharmaceutical Cases, *ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Health Care and Pharmaceuticals and Civil Practice and Procedure and Trial Practice Committees*, March 2016.

Corporations & Cartels: Should You Be a Plaintiff?, *American Bar Association*, 62nd Antitrust Law Spring Meeting, March 2014.

Developments in Antitrust Cases Alleging Delayed Generic Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry, *American Antitrust Institute*, 5th Annual Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement Conference, December 2011.

Class Certification and Calculation of Damages, *American Bar Association*, Section of Antitrust Law and *International Bar Association*, 8th International Cartel Workshop, February 2010.

Class Certification Discussion and Demonstration, *American Bar Association*, Section of Antitrust Law, The Antitrust Litigation Course, October 2007.

Antitrust Injury and the Predominance Requirement in Antitrust Class Actions, *American Bar Association*, Houston Chapter, April 2007.

Class Certification Discussion and Demonstration, *American Bar Association*, Section of Antitrust Law, The Antitrust Litigation Course, October 2005.

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INVITED PRESENTATIONS (cont'd.)

What Can an Economist Say About the Presence of Conspiracy?, *American Bar Association*, Antitrust Law, The Antitrust Litigation Course, October 2003.

Lessons from Gas Deregulation, *International Association for Energy Economics*, Houston Chapter, December 2002.

A Retrospective Look at Wholesale Gas Industry Restructuring, *Center for Research in Regulated Industries*, 20th Annual Conference of the Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Competition, May 2001.

The Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Damages, *American Conference Institute*, 6th National Advanced Forum, January 2001.

Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing Under Federal and State Law, *Golden State Antitrust and Unfair Competition Law Institute*, 8th Annual Meeting, October 2000.

Non-Price Predation--Some New Thinking About Exclusionary Behavior, *Houston Bar Association*, Antitrust and Trade Regulation Section, October 2000.

After the Guilty Plea: Does the Defendant Pay the Price in the Civil Damage Action, *American Bar Association*, Section of Antitrust Law, 48th Annual Spring Meeting, April 2000.

Economics of Restructuring in Gas Distribution, *Center for Research in Regulated Industries*, 12th Annual Western Conference, July 1999.

A Basic Speed Law for the Information Superhighway, *California State Bar Association*, December 1998.

Innovation in Regulation, *Center for Research in Regulated Industries*, 11th Annual Western Conference, July/September 1998.

Electric Industry Deregulation: What Does the Future Hold?, *Los Angeles Headquarters Association*, November 1996.

Why Deregulate Electric Utilities?, *National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners*, November 1995.

Restructuring U.S. Power Markets: What Can the Gas Industry's Experience Tell Us?, *National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners*, July 1995.

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INVITED PRESENTATIONS (cont'd.)

Natural Gas Restructuring: Lessons for Electric Utilities and Regulators, *International Association for Energy Economics*, May 1995.

Techniques in the Direct and Cross-Examination of Economic, Financial, and Damage Experts, *The Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law Section of the State Bar of California and The Los Angeles County Bar Association*, 2nd Annual Golden State Antitrust and Trade Regulation Institute, October 1994.

Demonstration: Deposition of Expert Witnesses and Using Legal Technology, *National Association of Attorneys General*, 1994 Antitrust Training Seminar, September 1994.

Direct and Cross Examination of Financial, Economic, and Damage Experts, *The State Bar of California, Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law Section*, May 1994.

Price Premiums in Gas Purchase Contracts, *International Association for Energy Economics*, October 1992.

Valuing Water Supply Reliability, *Western Economic Association*, Natural Resources Section, July 1992.

Transportation Services After Order 636: "Back to the Future" for Natural Gas, Seminar sponsored by Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, May 1992.

The Cost of an Unreliable Water Supply for Southern California, Forum presented by Micronomics, Inc., May 1991.

Market Definition: It's Time for Some "New Learning", *Los Angeles County Bar Association*, Antitrust and Corporate Law Section, December 1989.

Market Definition in Antitrust Cases: Some New Thinking, *Oregon State Bar*, Antitrust Law Section, March 1987.

Future Directions for Antitrust Activity in the Natural Gas Industry, *International Association of Energy Economists*, February 1987.

Information Externalities in Oil and Gas Leasing, *Western Economic Association Meetings*, Natural Resources Section, July 1983.

Economic Analysis of Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing, *Western States Land Commissioners Association*, December 1982.

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PUBLISHED ARTICLES

“Statistical Significance and Statistical Error in Antitrust Analysis,” *Antitrust Law Journal*, Volume 81, Issue 2, July 2017.

“The Predominance Requirement for Antitrust Class Actions--Can Relevant Market Analysis Help?,” American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, *Economics Committee Newsletter*, Volume 7, No. 1, Spring 2007.

“A Retrospective Look at Wholesale Gas: Industry Restructuring,” *Journal of Regulatory Economics*, January 2002.

“Balance Needed in Operating Agreements as Industry’s Center of Gravity Shifts to State Oil Firms,” *Oil & Gas Journal*, October 2000.

“What Can We Expect From Restructuring In Natural Gas Distribution?” *Energy Law Journal*, January 2000.

“Gas Experience Can Steer Power Away from Deregulation Snags,” *Oil & Gas Journal*, August 1996.

“Anatomy of FERC Order 636: What’s out, What’s in,” *Oil & Gas Journal*, June 1992.

“Antitrust II – Future Direction for Antitrust in the Natural Gas Industry,” *Natural Gas*, November 1987.

“Information Externalities in Oil and Gas Leasing,” *Contemporary Policy Issues*, March 1984.

“Regression Analysis in Antitrust Cases: Opening the Black Box,” *Philadelphia Lawyer*, July 1983.

“Foreign Competition in Antitrust Law,” *The Journal of Law & Economics*, April 1983.

REGULATORY SUBMISSIONS

In the Matter of the Application of Southern California Gas Company Regarding Year Six (1999-2000) Under its Experimental Gas Cost Incentive Mechanism and Related Gas Supply Matters; A.00-06-023, Public Utilities Commission of the State of California, November 2001.

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REGULATORY SUBMISSIONS (cont'd.)

Sempra Energy and KN Energy, Incorporation; Docket No. EC99-48-000 (Affidavit and Verified Statement), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, March/May 1999.

Rulemaking on the Commission's Own Motion to Assess and Revise the Regulatory Structure Governing California's Natural Gas Industry (Market Conditions Report), Public Utilities Commission of the State of California, July 1998.

In the Matter of the Application of Pacific Enterprises, Enova Corporation, et al. for Approval of a Plan of Merger Application No. A. 96-10-038, Public Utilities Commission of the State of California, August/October 1997.

In re: Koch Gateway Pipeline Company; Docket No. RP 97-373-000, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, May/October 1997 and February 1998.

In the Matter of the Application of Sadlerochit Pipeline Company for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity; Docket No. P-96-4, Alaska Public Utilities Commission, May 1996.

Public Funding of Electric Industry Research, Development, and Demonstration (RD&D) Under Partial Deregulation, California Energy Commission, January 1995.

NorAm Gas Transmission Company; Docket No. RP94-343-000, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, August 1994/June 1995.

Natural Gas Vehicle Program; Investigation No. 919-10-029, California Public Utilities Commission, July 1994.

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation; Docket No. RP93-136-000 (Proposed Firm-to-the-Wellhead Rate Design), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, January 1994.

In re: Sierra Pacific's Proposed Nomination for Service on Tuscarora Gas Pipeline; Docket No. 93-2035, The Public Service Commission of Nevada, July 1993.

Employment Gains in Louisiana from Entergy-Gulf States Utilities Merger, Louisiana Public Utilities Commission, December 1992.

Employment Gains to the Beaumont Area from Entergy-Gulf States Utilities Merger, Texas Public Utilities Commission, August 1992.

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REGULATORY SUBMISSIONS (cont'd.)

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation; Docket No. RS 92-86-000 (Affidavit regarding Transco's Proposed IPS Service), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, June 1992.

In Re: Pipeline Service Obligations; Docket No. RM91-11-000; Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implementing Transportation Under Part 284 of the Commission's Regulations; Docket No. RM91-3-000; Revisions to the Purchased Gas Adjustment Regulations; Docket No. RM90-15-000, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, May 1991.

In the Matter of Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America; Docket No. CP89-1281 (Gas Inventory Charge Proposal), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, January 1990.

In the Matter of United Gas Pipeline Company, UniSouth, Cypress Pipeline Company; Docket No. CP89-2114-000 (Proposed Certificate of Storage Abandonment by United Gas Pipeline Company), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, December 1989.

In the Matter of Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company; Docket No. CP89-470 (Gas Inventory Charge Proposal), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, July 1989.

In the Matter of Take-Or-Pay Allocation Proposed by Mississippi River Transmission Corporation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, March 1988.

In the Matter of Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America: Docket No. RP87-141-000 (Gas Inventory Charge Proposal), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, December 1987.

In the Matter of Application of Wisconsin Gas Company for Authority to Construct New Pipeline Facilities; 6650-CG-104, Public Service Commission, State of Wisconsin, August 1987.

Trans-Alaska Pipeline System: Docket Nos. OR 78-1-014 and OR 78-1-016 (Phase 1 Remand), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, October 1983.

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Proceeding	Court/Commission/ Agency	Docket or File
1. <u>In Re: AndroGel Antitrust Litigation</u>	U.S. District Court, Northern District of Georgia	Case No. 1:09-MD-2084-TWT
2. <u>In Re: Rail Freight Surcharge Antitrust Litigation</u>	U.S. District Court, District of Columbia	Case No. 1:07-MC-00489
3. <u>UFCW & Employers Benefit Trust, et al., v. Sutter Health, et al.</u>	Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco	No. CGC 14-538451 No. CGC-18-565398
4. <u>Sourceone Dental Inc. v. Patterson Companies, et al.</u>	U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York	Case No. 15-cv-05440
5. <u>In re: Thalomid and Revlimid Antitrust Litigation</u>	U.S. District Court, District of Connecticut	C.A. No. 3:14-MD-2516 (SRU)
6. <u>In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litigation</u>	U.S. District Court, District of Rhode Island	MDL No. 2472, Master File No. 1:13-md-2472-S-PAS
7. <u>CVS Health Corporation, Caremark, LLC, and Caremark, PCS, LLC v. Vividus LLC f/k/a HM Compounding Services, LLC, and HMX Services, LLC d/b/a HM Compounding</u>	American Arbitration Association	Case No. 01-14-0002-0801
8. <u>In Re: Qualcomm Litigation</u>	U.S. District Court, Southern District of California	Case No. 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD
9. <u>In re: Niaspan Antitrust Litigation</u>	U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania	MDL 2460, Master Case No. 2:13-md-2460
10. <u>Littop Enterprises Limited, et al. v. Ukraine</u>	The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce	SCC Case No 2015/092
11. <u>In re: Restasis (Cyclosporine Ophthalmic Emulsion) Antitrust Litigation</u>	U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York	Case No. 18-MD-2819 (NG) (LB)

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Proceeding	Court/Commission/ Agency	Docket or File
12. <u>In re: Opana ER Antitrust Litigation</u>	U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois	Civil Action No. 14-cv-10150
13. <u>In re: Intuniv Antitrust Litigation</u>	U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts	Civil Action No. 16-cv-12653-ADB (Direct)
14. <u>SS&C Technologies, Inc. v. Clearwater Analytics, LLC</u>	Superior Court for the State of Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford	No. X07-HHD-CV-16-6070719-S
15. <u>In re: Zetia (Ezetimibe) Antitrust Litigation</u>	U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia Norfolk Division	MDL No. 2836 Civil Action No. 18-md-2836-RBS-DEM
16. <u>In re: Glumetza Antitrust Litigation</u>	U.S. District Court, Northern District of California	Case No. 3:19-cv-05822-WHA
17. <u>In re: Keurig Green Mountain Single-Serve Coffee Antitrust Litigation</u>	U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York	No. 1:14-md-02542 (VSB) (SLC) No. 1:19-cv-00325 (VSB)
18. <u>In Re: Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation</u>	U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York	No. 05-md-1720
19. <u>International Construction Products, LLC v. Caterpillar Inc., Komatsu America Corp., Associated Auction Services, LLC doing business as Cat Auction Services.</u>	U.S. District Court, District of Delaware	C.A. No. 15-108-RGA
20. <u>In re: Novartis and Par Antitrust Litigation</u>	U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York	Case No. 1:18-cv-04361-AKH